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Abstract
This paper examines the investment and welfare eﬀects of a preferential trading area
(PTA) on member and non-member countries when countries diﬀer in their relative
size. I numerically solve a three-country and two-goodmodel to characterize equilibria
pertaining to investment diverting and creating eﬀects of a preferential trade area. I
conclude that welfare benefits of a preferential trade area are non-negative for the
member countries, and could go either way for the non-member countries depending
on their relative size. There exist equilibria which, given the parameter values and the
relative size, result in welfare improvement in non-member countries.
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1 Introduction
The post-worldwar II period has seen a remarkable growth in the formation of preferential
trade areas (PTAs), a discriminatory reduction in tariﬀs by a country in favor of a subset
of countries, among nations around the world. The European Union (EU), the North
American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) and theAssociation of SouthEastAsianNations
(ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA) are a few notable examples. Viner (1950) argues that a
preferential trade area may have a positive eﬀect in which more trade is created in both
member and non-member countries. It could also have a negative trade diverting eﬀect
when trade increases in themember countries anddecreases in the non-member countries.1
But there is less attention paid to the investment eﬀects of a preferential trade area, which
assumes greater importance due to an increased growth of investment flows in the world
economy. Between 1973-1997, the annual rate of growth of global foreign investment is
9.5 percent almost twice as large as that of global exports, which grew by only 4.8 percent.
The discrepancy in the growth rates is even more pronounced in recent years. Between
1991-1999, the foreign investment flows have grown by 26 percent per year compared with
the growth of the exports of goods and non-factor services by about 5.5 percent per year. 2
This paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze the investment and welfare
eﬀects of a preferential trade area on member countries and non-member counties when
countries diﬀer in their size.3 The multinational firms are the main medium through
which investment flows across countries. As in case of the trade eﬀects, the formation of
a preferential trade area may have both investment creating and diverting eﬀects. It may
divert investment by making the integrated region an attractive location for production
1Panagariya (2000) provides an excellent survey of the literature on the welfare eﬀects of trade diverting
and trade creating free trade agreements.
2The developed countries still account for a greater majority of these global investment flows. The share of
developed countries in total inflows rose from 62% in 1993 to 74% in 1999 and in total outflows rose from 85%
in 1993 to 91% in 1999. But for developing countries, ratio of inward foreign direct investment stock to GDP
has been rising steadily. This ratio increased from 5.4 in 1980 to 10.5 in 1990, and further to 20 in 1998. See
Kleinert (2001) for more detailed statistics.
3I usemember countries or the integrated region interchangeably to label countrieswhich formapreferential
trade area. Similarly, I use non-member countries or non-integrated region interchangeably to label countries
that are not part of the preferential trade area.
2
due to its larger market, and hence, shift investment by multinational firms away from
non-members to members. However, a preferential trade area allows multinational firms
to operate only one plant in the integrated region compared to the pre-PTA case when they
had a separate plant in each country, which creates new investment by freeing up resources
and allowing new firms to enter themarket.4 This could create investment in bothmember
and non-member countries.
The development of the new trade theory mainly due to Krugman (1979), which ac-
counts for increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition and product diﬀerentiation,
has opened up new frontiers for the study of multinational enterprises, and hence, the
investment eﬀects of preferential trade areas. More recently, the theory of multinational
enterprises has evolved significantly. Brainard (1993) and Markusen (1995) discuss that a
multinational enterprise must have ownership, location and internalization advantages to
oﬀset the higher costs of foreign production such as communications and transport costs,
higher costs of stationing personnel abroad, and barriers due to language, customs and
being outside the local business and government networks.5
One line of research on multinational enterprises focuses on the choice between licens-
ing and investing across borders. Ethier (1986) incorporates the internalization decision
into a general equilibrium trade model based on specific factor endowments with a dif-
ferentiated manufacturing sector. The internalization decision of the firm is a response to
imperfections in contracting under uncertainty. Horstmann and Markusen (1987) focus
on the internalization decision in a partial equilibrium framework, where production in
the destination market may be chosen over licensing in order to maintain a reputation for
4After the formation of a preferential trade area, there are no trade barriers between the member countries.
It pays the multinational firms to own one plant and supply (or export in more technical sense) their output
from one location in the integrated region. So, the integrated region is treated as one ”economic” country
ignoring any politico-nationalistic issues which may come with it.
5These advantages are discussed as follows. First, amultinational firmshouldhave anownership advantage
in some unique asset such as network capital, proprietary process technology or product designs or an
established reputational capital that gives the firm market power and is associated with increasing returns
across the firm, and the motivation for expansion is to maximize the returns to this asset. Second, there is
an internalization advantage, such that the firm is unable to realize the full value of the asset through the
market, due to transaction costs or other market failures. This determines the choice of direct investment over
licensing. Third, there is an advantage to locating production near consumers or factors across borders, which
makes international expansion more profitable than exporting.
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quality. Ethier and Markusen (1996) similarly focus on the internalization decision in a
partial equilibrium setting. The decision between exporting and overseas production via
licensing or investment depends in part on a trade-oﬀ between variable transportation
costs and a fixed cost of foreign production.
Another line of literature focuses on the choice between exporting and investing across
borders, which hinges on the locational advantages (Krugman (1983), Helpman (1984),
Markusen (1984), and Helpman and Krugman (1985)). These models explain vertical
expansion across borders in terms of factor proportions diﬀerences, and conclude that
when factor endowments are similar, there is no incentive for multinational investment.
So, the cross-border investment flows necessarily arise because of factor price diﬀerentials.
Though these models explain the vertical multinational investment activity, they do not
account for the horizontal multinational activity, which is the predominant type of foreign
investment present between countries of similar sizes.
Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) show how the technology and division of world
endowment between countries may determine the mix of national and multinational firms
that operate in the equilibrium. They also demonstrate how the presence of trade costs
changes the pattern of trade and creates incentives for factor mobility which may lead
to agglomeration of activity in a single country and to multinationality of firms. They
conclude that multinationals are more likely to exist, the more similar are countries in both
relative and absolute endowments. Markusen and Mascus (2001) find empirical support
for these conclusions.
A few applications of these models examine the investment eﬀects of a preferential
trade area. Baldwin et al (1999) provide evidence that the EU’s single market program
(EU92) significantly shifted foreign investment flows away from the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) nations to the EU member nations. Motta and Norman (1993, 1996)
discuss the eﬀects of market integration and growth on locational choices of multinational
firms and welfare of the member countries. They use a game theoretic framework and
provide conclusions which are similar to this paper. However, they do not allow for
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entry of new firms, and the welfare comparisons in their paper exclude the non-member
countries and profits of multinational firms. Their paper does take into account the cost
diﬀerences between the member countries to look at the diﬀering eﬀects of preferential
liberalization within the integrated region.
Ekholm et. al (2007) consider a model concentrating on export-platform foreign direct
investment in which an aﬃliate’s output is largely sold in a third country rather than in the
host or the parent market in response to a preferential trade area between the third country
and the host. This paper considers horizontal foreign direct investment in which aﬃliates
sell their output only in the host market. Ranjan (2006), keeping in line with the locational
advantage theory, studies the investment and welfare eﬀects of a preferential trade area
and concludes that if the investment creating eﬀects are strong enough they could provide
welfare gains for both member and non-member countries. However, he assumes that all
countries are identical in size giving rise to a symmetric number of firms. However, I allow
for a diﬀerence in the country sizes.
The results of this paper can be summarized here as follows. Depending on the relative
size of the integrated regionwith respect to the non-integrated region, a preferential trading
arrangement may result in investment diversion or investment creation. For a majority of
cases in my analysis based on numerical simulations, the formation of a preferential trade
area has an investment diverting eﬀect. Investment diversion, however, may not always
result in an unfavorable eﬀect on thewelfare of the non-integrated region. Also, investment
creation is not a suﬃcient condition for welfare improvement of the non-integrated region
as there is no change in its welfare in some cases despite investment creation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the basic
model, and identifies various equilibria in the pre-PTA and post-PTA regimes. Section 3
discusses the investment and welfare eﬀects in the two regimes. Section 4 concludes the
paper, and provides the implications and future extensions of this research.
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2 The Model
I consider a world with three countries having endowments of labor, Li (i = 1, 2 and 3).
Countries 1 and 2 are potential members of a preferential trade area and the third country
represents the rest of world. Each country in the model has either a numeraire good sector
or a diﬀerentiated good sector or both. There are two types of firms in the diﬀerentiated
goods sector - the national and the multinational firms. The important distinction between
the two assumed for the purposes of this paper is their location decisions. A national firm
has a single plant in the home country and export the diﬀerentiated goods to the foreign
markets. A multinational firm owns a plant in each country and sells the diﬀerentiated
goods only in the host country, the so-called horizontal multinational firms (as opposed to
vertical multinational firms, which export their output from a host location). The exports
of diﬀerentiated goods are subject to a trade barrier in the importing countries. So, the
decision to be a national firm or multinational firm depends on the costs of owning an
additional plant in a foreign market relative to trade barriers faced by exports from home.
The utility function for country i is:
Ui = Qθi .Y
1−θ
i (1)
where Y is the numeraire good and Q is an index of diﬀerentiated goods consumed. This
index is given by (
∑
qπi )
1/πwhereπ = σ−1σ and σ is the elasticity of substitution between two
varieties of diﬀerentiated good which is greater than one. The demand for a diﬀerentiated
good is:
qi =
p−σi∑
j
p1−σj
Ei (2)
where Ei is the total expenditure on the diﬀerentiated goods in country i. Following Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977), for a large number of varieties, the elasticity of demand for each variety
can be approximated by σ.
On the production side, the numeraire good sector uses only labor as an input, whereas
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the diﬀerentiated good sector uses both labor and capital. Each unit of numeraire good
requires 1 unit of labor, thus fixing the wage rate and the price of the numeraire good to
be one in each country. Each firm producing the diﬀerentiated good incurs two types of
fixed costs, the corporate or firm level fixed costs (F1) and the plant level fixed costs (F2),
and a constant marginal cost (c), which is assumed to be identical across countries. The
diﬀerentiated goods sector exhibits increasing returns to scale at the corporate level and
scale economies at the plant level. The exports of diﬀerentiated goods involve an iceberg
transportation cost (1 − τ) due to trade barriers imposed by each country against imports.
As a result, the marginal cost (MC) equals c for the goods produced at home and c/τ for the
exported goods. The price per unit of a diﬀerentiated good is a markup over its marginal
cost:
p =
σ
σ − 1MC (3)
Given the above pricing rule, the operating profit from a variety produced in country i and
sold in country j (OΠi j) is:
OΠi j = (pij −MC)qij =
pijqi j
σ
(4)
where pij and qij are the price and quantity of a variety produced in country i and sold in
country j. Free entry and exit of firms of each type in the diﬀerentiated goods sector yields
zero profits in the equilibrium.
2.1 The Pre-PTA Equilibria
Let ni be the number of national firms in country i, and m be the number of multinational
firms. Since multinational firms operate a plant in each country, m is the same across
countries. Given the Cobb-Douglas utility function in (1) and the wage rate of 1, the
expenditure in country j (Ej) equals θLj. Using the CES price indices in the diﬀerentiated
good sector, the quantity of a variety produced in country i and sold in country j (qij), the
quantity of a variety produced in country i and sold in country i (qii) and the total revenue
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for a country i firm from its sales in country j (pijqi j) are:
qij =
p−σi j
nip1−σi j + (nj +m)p
1−σ
j j + nkp
1−σ
kj
θLj (5)
qii =
p−σii
(ni +m)p1−σii + njp
1−σ
ji + nkp
1−σ
ki
θLi (6)
pijqi j =
p1−σi j
nip1−σi j + (nj +m)p
1−σ
j j + nkp
1−σ
kj
θLj (7)
i  j  k
Using transportation cost inclusive export prices pij = pik = pii/τ = σσ−1
c
τ , we can rewrite the
total revenue and the operating profit of a national firm in country i from sales in country
j as:
pijqi j =
τσ−1
niτσ−1 + (nj +m) + nkτσ−1
θLj (8)
OΠi j =
(
τσ−1
niτσ−1 + (nj +m) + nkτσ−1
)
θLj
σ
(9)
The total operating profits of a national firm in country i (OΠi) from its sales in all three
markets and the total operating profits of a multinational firm (OΠm) from its sales in the
host nation are:
OΠi = OΠii +OΠi j +OΠik (10)
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ Li(ni +m) + (nj + nk)τσ−1 +
Ljτσ−1
(nj +m) + (ni + nk)τσ−1
+
Lkτσ−1
(nk +m) + (ni + nj)τσ−1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ θσ
OΠm=
(
Li
(ni +m) + (nj + nk)τσ−1
+
Lj
(nj +m) + (ni + nk)τσ−1
+
Lk
(nk +m) + (ni + nj)τσ−1
)
θ
σ
(11)
i, j, k = 1, 2, 3 and i  j  k
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The zero profit condition for the equilibrium implies that operating profits be less than
equal to total fixed costs:
OΠi ≤ (F1 + F2) ni ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3 (12)
OΠm ≤ (F1 + 3F2) m ≥ 0 (13)
Table 1: The Pre-PTA Equilibrium
Equilibrium Type Parametric Range
n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0
F1
F2
< min
(
LIτσ−1−L3(1−2τσ−1)
L3(1−τσ−1) ,
LIτσ−1(1+3τσ−1)−L3(1−3τσ−1)(1+τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1)τσ−1+L3(1−τ2(σ−1))
)
, LIL3 >
1+τσ−1
1−τσ−1
n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0
F1
F2
< 3τ
σ−1
1−τσ−1 , 2τ
σ−1 < LIL3 <
1+τσ−1
τσ−1
n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0
F1
F2
= 3τ
σ−1
1−τσ−1 , 2τ
σ−1 < LIL3 <
1+τσ−1
τσ−1
n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m = 0
F1
F2
< 2L3τ
σ−1−LI(1−3τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1) , 2τ
σ−1 > LIL3
n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 max
(
3τσ−1
1−τσ−1 ,
2L3τσ−1−LI(1−3τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1)
)
< F1F2 <
2L3−LI(1−3τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1)
n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 max
(
3τσ−1
1−τσ−1 ,
LIτσ−1(1+3τσ−1)−L3(1−3τσ−1)(1+τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1)τσ−1+L3(1−τ2(σ−1))
)
< F1F2
< LI(1+3τ
σ−1)−2L3(1−3τσ−1)
(LI+2L3)(1−τσ−1)
n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 max
(
LI(1+3τσ−1)−2L3(1−3τσ−1)
(LI+2L3)(1−τσ−1) ,
2L3τσ−1−LI(1−3τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1)
)
< F1F2
I solve the system of equations in (12) and (13) to compute the parametric conditions for
the pre-PTA equilibria, which are summarized in Table 1. The equilibria with only national
firms are exporting, onlymultinational firms are multinational, and both kinds of firms are
mixed. The exporting equilibria are more likely to exist, the lower are the transportation
costs (higher is τ), the lower is the firm level fixed cost (F1) to the plant level fixed cost (F2),
and the higher is the elasticity of demand (σ) of a variety.
Figure 1 plots the pre-PTAequilibria in ( LIL3 ,
F1
F2
) spacewhereLI is the size of the integrated
region and equals (L1 + L2) and thus,
LI
L3
is the relative size of the integrated region with
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respect to country 3.6 As can be seen, the relative size is an important determinant of
the pre-PTA equilibrium that is obtained. Given τ, there are no national firms in the
Figure 1: The Pre-PTA Equilibrium
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Notes: The figure is plotted for the following values of the parameters: θ = 0.8, σ = 5, τ = 0.84, F1 = 0.05,
L1 + L2 + L3 = 3. The relative size is the ratio of the size of the (potentially) integrated region (LI) with respect
to the size of country 3 (L3). The fixed costs ratio is the ratio of the firm level fixed cost (F1) with respect
to the plant level fixed cost (F2). The numbered regions represent the possible equilibria in the pre-PTA
case. n1 = 0,n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m = 0 is represented by region (1), n1 = 0,n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 by region (2),
n1 > 0, n2 > 0,n3 > 0,m = 0 by region (3), n1 = 0,n2 = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 by region (4), n1 > 0,n2 > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0
by region (5), and n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0 by region (6). Also, the horizontal line above region (3) is the
mixed equilibrium n1 > 0,n2 > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0.
integrated region and it depends on the imports of diﬀerentiated goods from country 3
6Countries 1 and 2 are the potential members of the preferential trade area as we see in the next section. The
comparisons thus involve countries 1 and 2 as the (potentially) integrated region and country 3 (as the rest of
the world (ROW)) even in the pre-PTA regime. Appendix A derives the conditions for the Pre-PTA equilibria
listed in Table 1.
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(region (1) in Figure 1: n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m = 0) if the integrated region is small
relative to country 3. Similarly, country 3 has no national firms (region (6) in Figure
1: n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0) if the integrated region is larger relative to country 3.
For intermediate values of relative size we have only national firms in all countries or a
mix of national and multinational firms. This implies that when one region is relatively
larger than the other indicating a skewed distribution of world income, the pattern of
trade is inter-industry. The richer countries export the diﬀerentiated goods and the poorer
countries export the numeraire or the homogenous goods. Also, the pre-PTA equilibrium
has production bymultinational firms when countries are more similar in size or if relative
dissimilarity in sizes is compensated by lowering of F2, the plant level fixed cost, relative to
F1, the firm level fixed cost. Thus, an equitable distribution of world income supports the
existence of an intra-industry pattern of trade inwhich countries export various varieties of
diﬀerentiatedgoods to each other or the existence ofmultinational firms. It is not surprising
to find that multinational firms are more likely to exist when both the regions are similar
in size. The smaller size of one region may not make it viable to for the multinational firm
to incur fixed costs of owning an additional plant in that country, and make exports from
the national firms in the larger country a more viable option.7
2.2 The Post-PTA Equilibria
In this section, we study the equilibria that exist when a group of countries preferentially
liberalize their trade with each other. More specifically, we allow countries 1 and 2 to form
a preferential trade area by eliminating all trade barriers on their goods. However, the
trade barriers are kept at the initial level on goods coming from country 3. Let nI and n3 be
the number of national firms in the integrated region and country 3 (or the non-integrated
region), andm be the number of multinationals in the post-PTA regime. As in the pre-PTA
case, the quantity of a variety produced in country i and sold in country j (qij), and the
7The horizontal line on top of region (3) is characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria both pure mixed
(n1 > 0,n2 > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0) and pure Exporting (n1 > 0,n2 > 0,n3 > 0,m = 0) with the latter existing for a
high majority of values of the relative size.
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quantity of a variety produced in country i and sold in country i (qii), respectively, are:
qij =
p−σi j
nip1−σi j + (nj +m)p
1−σ
j j
θLj (14)
qii =
p−σii
(ni +m)p1−σii + njp
1−σ
ji
θLi (15)
i, j = I, 3 i  j
Following from the pre-PTA case, the total operating profits of a national firm in region i
and a multinational firm in the post-PTA regime, respectively, are:
OΠi=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ Li(ni +m) + (nj)τσ−1 +
Ljτσ−1
(nj +m) + (ni)τσ−1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ θσ (16)
OΠm=
(
Li
(ni +m) + (nj)τσ−1
+
Lj
(nj +m) + (ni)τσ−1
)
θ
σ
(17)
After the formation of the preferential trade area, a multinational firm needs to maintain
only oneplant in the integrated region incurring a fixed cost of only (F1+2F2). Thepost-PTA
Table 2: The Post-PTA Equilibrium
Equilibrium Type Parametric Range
nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0
F1
F2
< min
(
LIτσ−1−L3(1−2τσ−1)
L3(1−τσ−1) ,
2τσ−1
1−τσ−1
)
, LIL3 >
1
τσ−1
nI > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0
F1
F2
< 2τ
σ−1
1−τσ−1 , τ
σ−1 < LIL3 <
1
τσ−1
nI > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0
F1
F2
= 2τ
σ−1
1−τσ−1 , τ
σ−1 < LIL3 <
1
τσ−1
nI = 0, n3 > 0,m = 0
F1
F2
< L3τ
σ−1−LI(1−2τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1) , τ
σ−1 > LIL3
nI = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 max
(
2τσ−1
1−τσ−1 ,
L3τσ−1−LI(1−2τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1)
)
< F1F2 <
L3−LI(1−2τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1)
nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 max
(
2τσ−1
1−τσ−1 ,
LIτσ−1−L3(1−2τσ−1)
L3(1−τσ−1)
)
< F1F2 <
LI−L3(1−2τσ−1)
L3(1−τσ−1)
nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 max
(
L3−LI(1−2τσ−1)
LI(1−τσ−1) ,
LI−L3(1−2τσ−1)
L3(1−τσ−1)
)
< F1F2
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equilibrium can be characterized by the following zero profit conditions:
OΠi ≤ (F1 + F2) ni ≥ 0 i = I, 3 (18)
OΠm ≤ (F1 + 2F2) m ≥ 0 (19)
Figure 2: The Post-PTA Equilibrium
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Relative Size
Fi
xe
d 
Co
st
s 
Ra
tio
(4) 
(2) 
(1) (3) 
(5) 
(6) 
Notes: The figure is plotted for the following values of the parameters: θ = 0.8, σ = 5, τ = 0.84, F1 = 0.05,
LI+L3 = 3. The relative size is the ratio of the size of the integrated region (LI)with respect to the size of country 3
(L3). The fixed costs ratio is the ratio of the firm level fixed cost (F1) with respect to the plant level fixed cost (F2).
Thenumbered regions represent thepossible equilibria in thepost-PTAcase. nI = 0, n3 > 0,m = 0 is represented
by region (1); nI = 0,n3 > 0,m > 0 by region (2); nI > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0 by region (3); nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 by
region (4); nI > 0,n3 = 0,m > 0 by region (5); and nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0 by region (6). Also, the horizontal line
above (3) is the mixed equilibrium nI > 0,n3 > 0,m > 0.
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Table 2 details the parametric conditions for the post-PTA equilibria.8 Figure 2 plots the
post-PTA equilibria ( LIL3 ,
F1
F2
) space.9 The eﬀect of the preferential trade area is to increase
the range of relative size and fixed costs ratio in which there are national firms in the
integrated region, and decrease the area in which there are national firms in country 3.
Thus, a typical eﬀect of the preferential trade area is to divert the investment away from
non-members to members. For example, region (6) in Figure (2) which represents the
post-PTA equilibrium in which there are national firms in the integrated region is much
larger than region (6) in Figure 1 in the pre-PTA equilibrium. Regions (1) and (2) which
have national firms in the non-integrated region shrink in size. A larger market in the
integrated region due to the preferential trade area makes it more attractive for both the
Table 3: Summery of the Pre-PTA and the Post-PTA Equilibria
Pre-PTA Equilibrium Post-PTA Equilibrium
n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0
n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0;nI > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0;
nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0;
nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0;nI > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0
n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0;nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0,
n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m = 0 nI = 0, n3 > 0,m = 0;nI = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0;
nI > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0;
nI > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0;nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0
n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0;nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0
n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0;nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0
n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0;nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0;
nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0
national and multinational firms to set up their plants there. We shall see below that the
non-integrated region has to be extremely large in size relative to the integrated region to
be unaﬀected by the preferential trade area. Table 3 summarizes the pairs of equilibria that
may exist before and after the preferential trade area. Depending on the values of F1F2 and
LI
L3
, each pre-PTA equilibrium is associated with a unique post-PTA equilibrium. We turn
8Appendix B derives the conditions for the post-PTA equilibria listed in Table 2.
9The horizontal line on top of region (3) in Figure 2 is characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria with the
pure exporting equilibria existing for the most of relative size values.
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now to a comparison of the pre-PTA and post-PTA equilibria to examine the investment
and welfare eﬀects of a preferential trade area.
3 Investment Creation and Diversion, and Welfare
Consider the utility function in (1):
Ui = Qθi Y
1−θ
i (20)
where Qi equals
(∑
qπi
) 1
π . Given the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the demand for the
numeraire good is (1 − θ)Li. Using equations (4) and (5), the demand for the numeraire
good and pij = pik = pii/τ = σσ−1
c
τ , the utility functions of a representative individual in
country i in the pre-PTA case and the post-PTA case are:10
UPrei = C ×
(
ni +m + njτσ−1 + nkτσ−1
) θ
σ−1 (21)
ni, nj, nk,m ≥ 0 i, j, k = 1, 2, 3 i  j  k
UPosti = C ×
(
ni +m + nkτσ−1
) θ
σ−1 (22)
ni, nk,m ≥ 0 i, k = I, 3 i  k
where C = θθ(1 − θ)1−θ
(
σ−1
σc
)θ
. Let NPreI and N
Pre
3 be the total number of firms in the
integrated region and country 3 in the pre-PTA case, respectively. Let NPostI and N
Post
3 be
the total number of firms in the integrated region and country 3 in the post-PTA case. The
preferential trade area is investment creating if
NPreI
NPostI
< 1 and
NPre3
NPost3
< 1. This means that
the total number of firms in the pre-PTA case is less than the total number in the post-PTA
case in both the integrated region and country 3. The preferential trade area is investment
diverting if
NPreI
NPostI
< 1 and
NPre3
NPost3
> 1 implying that it results in more investment in the
10Appendix C derives the expressions for the utility of a representative individual in the pre-PTA and the
post-PTA regimes. I also discuss in detail the investment and welfare eﬀects, and compare each pre-PTA
equilibrium with the corresponding post-PTA equilibrium.
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Figure 3: The Investment and Welfare Eﬀects
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Notes: The pre-PTA equilibrium is pure exporting (n1 > 0,n2 > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0) and the post-PTA
equilibrium is mixed (nI > 0,n3 > 0,m = 0). The relative size is the ratio of the size of the integrated
region to the side of country 3. The relative number is the ratio of number of firms in the pre-PTA case
to number of firms in the post-PTA case. The relative utility is the utility in the pre-PTA case relative
to the post-PTA case. The figure is plotted for the following values of the parameters: θ = 0.8, σ = 5,
τ = 0.84, F1 = 0.05, LI + L3 = 3.
integrated region at the expense of country 3. To figure out the welfare change, we look
at the utility in the pre-PTA regime relative to the post-PTA regime for region i
(
UPrei
UPosti
)
. If
UPrei
UPosti
< 1, thewelfare improves. There are two sources of thewelfare eﬀect of thepreferential
trade area, the eﬀect of total number of varieties of diﬀerentiatedgoods availableworldwide
and the eﬀect of number of varieties of diﬀerentiated goods produced at home. As can
be seen from the utility functions above, the varieties produced at home add more to the
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utility than the varieties produced abroad because the latter cost more due to the trade
barriers.
Figure 3 plots the total number of firms in the integrated and non-integrated region in
both regimes, the number of firms in the pre-PTA case relative to the post-PTA case, and
the utility in the pre-PTA case relative to the post-PTA case in both regions when both the
pre-PTA (n1 > 0, n2 > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0) and the post-PTA (nI > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0) equilibria
Figure 4: The Investment and Welfare Eﬀects (Cont’d)
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Notes: The pre-PTA equilibrium is pure exporting (n1 = 0,n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0) and the post-PTA
equilibrium is mixed (nI > 0,n3 = 0,m > 0). The relative size is the ratio of the size of the integrated
region to the side of country 3. The relative number is ratio of number of firms in the pre-PTA case
to number of firms in the post-PTA case. The relative utility is the utility in the pre-PTA case relative
to the post-PTA case. The figure is plotted for the following values of the parameters: θ = 0.8, σ = 5,
τ = 0.84, F1 = 0.05, LI + L3 = 3.
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are pure exporting. Both regions export and import diﬀerentiated goods implying presence
of intra-industry trade. From Figures 1 and 2 we know that this case arises for intermediate
values of the relative size and when the plant level fixed cost is high compared to the firm
level fixed cost making multinational activity less viable. As can be seen from panel (a),
the total number of firms in the integrated region is higher in the post-PTA case than in the
pre-PTA case. Also, the number of firms in the integrated region increase with its relative
size. The opposite is true for the non-integrated region in panel (b). So, the preferential
trade area diverts investment to the integrated region from the non-integrated region in
this case. This is also evident in panel (c) where I plot the relative number of firms in the
integrated and the non-integrated region. The relative number of firms curve lies below
one for the integrated region indicating more investment after the preferential trade area,
and lies below one for the non-integrated region. In panel (d) of the figure, the welfare of
the integrated region improves and that of country 3 worsens due to the preferential trade
area. The integrated region gains because it produces a greater number of varieties of the
diﬀerentiated goods. The non-integrated region has a corresponding decline in welfare
due to a loss in the domestic production.11
Figure 4depicts the investment andwelfare comparisonswhen thepre-PTAequilibrium
is n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 and the post-PTA equilibrium is nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0. The
integrated regionhas onlymultinational firms in the pre-PTAequilibrium,whereas country
3 has both national and multinational firms. However, after the preferential trade area, the
non-integrated region has onlymultinational firms, whereas the integrated region has both
national and multinational firms. So the preferential trade area allows investment in the
integrated region by national firms which were absent before the preferential trade area.
As can be seen from panels (a), (b), and (c), the preferential trade area causes an investment
diversion in this case also. The total number of firms in the integrated region in the post-
PTA case is higher than the pre-PTA case. However, the total number of firms after the
preferential trade area declines in the non-integrated region. The national firmswhichwere
11The simulation exercises show that the total number of firms worldwide remain the same in this case. So
the only eﬀect on welfare is due to a change in the number of varieties produced at home.
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exporting to the integrated region before the preferential trade area now find it more viable
to locate in the integrated region and serve the world market. In panel (d), the welfare
eﬀect is positive for the integrated region as the number of varieties worldwide increases
and the integrated region produces a greater number of varieties after the preferential trade
area. However, the welfare of country 3 remains unchanged as the decline in domestic
production is equally compensated by greater number of varieties available worldwide.
So an investment diversion may not always cause welfare decline in country 3.
Figure 5: The Investment and Welfare Eﬀects (Cont’d)
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Notes: The pre-PTA equilibrium is pure exporting (n1 = 0,n2 = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0) and the post-PTA
equilibrium is mixed (nI > 0,n3 = 0,m > 0). The relative size is the ratio of the size of the integrated
region to the side of country 3. The relative number is the ratio of number of firms in the pre-PTA case
to number of firms in the post-PTA case. The relative utility is the utility in the pre-PTA case relative
to the post-PTA case. The figure is plotted for the following values of the parameters: θ = 0.8, σ = 5,
τ = 0.84, F1 = 0.05, LI + L3 = 3.
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Finally, Figure 5 plots the investment andwelfare eﬀects when the pre-PTA equilibrium
is n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 and the post-PTA equilibrium is nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0. This
case also results in an investment diversion. The welfare eﬀect on the integrated region is
unambiguously positive. However, despite investment diversion, the welfare eﬀect on the
non-integrated region depends on its relative size. At lower values of the relative size, the
welfare eﬀect in the non-integrated region is positive. It is only when the integrated region
is much larger than the non-integrated region does the welfare eﬀect become negative for
latter. The non-integrated region experiences a welfare improvement when the eﬀect due
to number of varieties available more than oﬀsets the eﬀect due to diversion of investment.
But eventually the eﬀect due to decline in domestic production dominates the eﬀect due
to number of varieties available decreasing the welfare in the integrated region. So from
Figures 4 and 5, we see that investment diversion is not a suﬃcient condition for a welfare
decline in the non-integrated region.
Table 4: The Investment and Welfare Eﬀects
Equilibrium Investment Welfare eﬀects
Pre-PTA Post-PTA eﬀects Integrated Country 3
n1 > 0, n2 > 0,n3 = 0,m = 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0 none + unchanged
nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 diversion/creation + -
nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0 diversion + -
n1 > 0, n2 > 0,n3 > 0,m = 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 creation + unchanged
nI > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0 diversion + -
nI > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 diversion + -
nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 diversion + -
nI = 0, n3 > 0,m = 0 none unchanged unchanged
n1 = 0, n2 = 0,n3 > 0,m = 0 nI = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 diversion + -
nI > 0, n3 > 0,m = 0 diversion + -
nI > 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 diversion + -
n1 > 0, n2 > 0,n3 > 0,m > 0 nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 diversion/creation + -
nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 creation + unchanged
n1 = 0,n2 = 0, n3 > 0,m > 0 nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 diversion + -/+
nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 diversion + unchanged
n1 > 0,n2 > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0 diversion + -
nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 diversion + unchanged
nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 creation + +
n1 = 0, n2 = 0,n3 = 0,m > 0 nI > 0, n3 = 0,m = 0 diversion + -
nI > 0, n3 = 0,m > 0 diversion + +/-
Table 4 summarizes the investment and welfare eﬀects for all possible pre-PTA and
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the post-PTA equilibria. The preferential trade area has positive investment and welfare
eﬀects on the integrated region, and hurts the non-integrated region a majority of cases.
However, there are a few cases in which the preferential trade area creates investment in
both regions and does not result in decline in the non-integrated region’s welfare. In few
cases, the preferential trade area results in a welfare gain in both the integrated and non-
integrated region. This is the case when both the Pre-PTA (n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0)
and post-PTA (nI = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0) equilibria have only multinational firms. This is
identical to the multinational equilibrium in Ranjan (2003). In this case, the preferential
trade area results in investment creation because the multinational firms have to own only
one plant in the integrated region freeing up resources for the creation of more investment
and causing welfare gains in both regions. However, we encounter a case in which there
are only multinational firms in the pre-PTA case (n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n3 = 0,m > 0) and a
mixed equilibrium in the post-PTA case with national firms in the integrated region. The
preferential trade area causes investment diversion in this case. But the welfare eﬀect on
country 3 is positive initially when it is relatively similar to the integrated region in size
before it becomes negative at higher levels of the relative size.
4 Conclusion
The focus of this paper is on the investment and welfare eﬀects on the member and the
non-member countries as a result of a preferential trade area. Using numerical simulations,
I identify the possible equilibria that might arise in the pre-PTA and the post-PTA regimes.
The exporting equilibria exist if transportation costs are lower (τ is higher), the ratio of the
firm level fixed cost (F1) to the plant level fixed cost (F2) is lower, the elasticity of demand
(σ) of a variety is higher and thedistribution ofworld income ismore skewed. The opposite
should hold for the multinational equilibria. The number of national firms in a region in
any equilibrium increases with the relative size of that region. Thus, the relative size also
determines the pattern of trade. The larger the relative size of a region, the higher will
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be the number of national firms in that region, the closer will be the pattern of trade to
inter-industry kind. Similarly, the closer the regions are in terms of their size, the closer the
pattern of trade will be to intra-industry kind.
The eﬀect of a preferential trade area is to allow the integrated region to have the size
advantage to attract more national firms. The simulations exercises suggest that, in most
cases, the preferential trade area results in investment diversion as the integrated region
headquarters a greater number of national firms at the expense of country 3. There are also
cases in which the preferential trade area does not lead to investment diversion. In some
cases, it creates investment in both regions. Investment creation is a suﬃcient condition for
the preferential trade area to cause a welfare improvement in the integrated region but not
in country 3 as there are other eﬀects working at the same time. Similarly, the investment
diversion is a suﬃcient condition for welfare improvement in the integrated region but not
for country 3. The integrated region experiences a welfare improvement in cases involving
both investment creation and diversion because both eﬀects, number of varieties available
worldwide and number of varieties produced at home, work in its favor. The welfare of
country 3 depends on the relative strength of the two factors. The stronger is the first factor
relative to the second, the greater is welfare of country 3 in the post-PTA case relative to
the pre-PTA case.
In the future, this paper can improve upon the present results in at least twoways. First,
we can consider a more general framework by allowing for two factors of production in the
basic model. This will enable us to study the factor mobility issues under the preferential
trade area. Secondly, the present paper ignores the tariﬀ generating trade barriers. The loss
of tariﬀ revenuemight be expected to oﬀset some of the gains from a preferential trade area.
Thirdly, we can empirically examine the investment and welfare eﬀects of a preferential
trade area on member and non-member countries.
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